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Empires of the Silk Road is an ambitious work that fulfills its stated ambitions, fully.
Written with boldness and authority, it packs many punches and pulls few. Author
Christopher I. Beckwith manages to cover ~5,000-years-worth of Central Eurasian
history in this single volume; he sees those events differently than your common or
garden-variety Central Eurasian historian/philologist and demonstrates patiently and
precisely why he does so in a way that is rich and insightful. Beckwith’s work is both
complex and concise. It is provocative and persuasive. It is frequently captivating,
often surprising, occasionally perplexing, and sometimes slightly weird 1 (not that
there’s anything wrong with that).
Beckwith begins by presenting a series of First Stories, an intriguing collection of
Central Eurasian origin myths. In so doing, he demonstrates themes that persist as the
cultural inheritance of descendant peoples of widely separated locations, re-told over
time in daughter varieties of Proto-Indo-European languages, from the "Bronze Age
Hittites and Chou Chinese; the Classical period Scythians, Romans, Wu-sun, and
Koguryo; the medieval Turks and Mongols; and the Junghars and Manchus of the late
Renaissance and Enlightenment." (p. 2)
These Central Eurasian origin myths share patterns: a special child is supernaturally
conceived; its father, the true king, is overthrown by an evil usurper; child is left out in
the wilderness to die but does not die, due to tender care by wilderness animals. The
Shang dynasty child is protected by sheep and cattle and birds (p. 3); descendants of
Aeneas of Troy, twin babes Romulus and Remus are left out exposed, but are "nursed
by a she-wolf and fed by a bird2 (p. 4); north of Dunhuang, the Wu-sun prince is left
out on the steppe to die, but is suckled by a wolf and fed by a crow and survives (p. 6);
in the north, Tumen is cast out to the beasts, but the pigs and the horses and the birds of
the wilderness keep him warm, so he grows up to found the city of Ordus (p. 7); the
ancestor of the Turk people is left out in the wilderness to die but is saved by a she-wolf
(p. 8). In all these origin stories, a special child is born, undergoes trials and dangers
but nevertheless survives to become a great warrior whose prowess attracts others with
similar prowess; the hero warrior leads this brotherhood of warriors back to their
homeland, where the hero and retinue overthrow prior evil tyrant(s) and found a
glorious new dynasty. (p. 12)

Dr. Beckwith has a thing about “Modernism,” whatever that is. He has a thing about T.S. Eliot and
Ezra Pound. Go figure. Everything else about his book was fantastic.
2
Specifically, a woodpecker.
1
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The first-story happy ending of the lord and his blood-oath-bound retinue conquering
all is at the heart of what Beckwith calls the “Central Eurasian Culture Complex,” a
patriarchal comitatus structure that underlies the polities of Central Eurasia — and
beyond — from the earliest times up nearly to the present day. The Central Eurasian
Culture Complex is reflected in "historical sources on the Hittites, the Achaemenid
Persians, the Scythians, the Khwarizmians, the Hsiung-nu, the ancient and early
medieval Germanic peoples, the Sassanid Persians, the Huns, the Hephthalites, the
Koguryo, the early dynastic Japanese, the Turks" (15) among many others. This is
Beckwith’s thesis, and, over the succeeding chapters of his book, he proves his case (to
this reader, at least).
Chapter 1, “The Chariot Warriors.” Beckwith uses historical linguistics and
archaeology to trace the diaspora of Proto-Indo-European speakers, oath-bound bands
of warriors who sweep through neighboring states, spreading their Central Eurasian
Culture Complex traditions wherever they go.
Beckwith cites evidence of Central Eurasian Culture Complex traditions transforming
the peoples living in Kroraina (p. 35), in Anatolia (p. 37), among the Maryannu (p. 39)
and the peoples of the Indus in Northern India, even those of Mycenean Greece (p. 42).
The CECC effect produces change in as far east as the Yellow River Valley (p. 43).
Each contact leaves behind traceable traces, through language, actions, and objects.
In particular, the Proto-Indo-European mastery over the technology of warfare brought
these freewheeling nomad chariot warriors victory and power: they knew how to
engineer, build, and operate war chariots; they knew how to breed, train, and ride war
horses; they invented the light but powerful compound bow and trained expert archers
in their use. They seemed invincible.
Chapter 2, "The Royal Scythians," explains the rise of the mounted nomad warriors of
the great grasslands as they coalesced into empires. A mounted nomad people, the
Scythians "migrated into the Western Steppe and established themselves as a major
power" (p. 58) while “at the eastern end of the steppe zone, in what is now Mongolia,
former Inner Mongolia and the eastern Tarim Basin, the nomadic-dominant form of the
Central Eurasian Culture Complex became an established life-style between the eighth
and seventh centuries B.C.” (p. 70) Both empires depended on the trading system which
would become known as the Silk Road to accumulate wealth and power. Polities which
refused trade made themselves liable to invasion and defeat (if not outright destruction).
Chapter 3, “Between Roman and Chinese Legions,” concerns the era of expansion by
Rome, the peripheral empire to the west of the Central Asian Steppe, as it came into
conflict with peoples to its east: the Sarmatians, the Alans, the Parthians, the
Tokharians, and the Kushan Empire of northern India.

Comparative Civilizations Review

171

At roughly the same time, central plains China, a peripheral empire to the east of the
Central Asian Steppe, sought to expand into the Hsiung-nu empire to acquire its wealth
(and eventually succeeded). However, the aggressive expansionism into Central Asia
from east and west, eventually became a disaster for both invading empires: Silk Road
commerce declined, both empires collapsed, and with the collapse of trade came “the
end of Classical civilization.” (p. 92)
In Chapter 4, "The Age of Attila the Hun," Beckwith references the migration known
as the Great Wandering of Peoples from Central Eurasia to its west and to its south. Of
interest is that, although the fact of the migration is well-known, the specific reason for
this migration remains a mystery. (p. 107) What is not at issue is that the Great
Wandering of Peoples "re-established nearly all of Western Europe as part of the
Central Eurasian Culture Complex" (p. 94) and included “previously non-Romanized
Northern, Central and Eastern Europe . . . the formerly Romanized parts of North
Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, England, France, Belgium, Switzerland, northern Italy,
Germania, and most of the Balkans." (p. 110)
Chapter 5, "The Turk Empire," begins on the Eastern Steppe, in which,
following the dynamics of the Central Eurasian Culture Complex, the Turk people
overthrew their overlords, the Avars, and chased their remnants to the ends of
Eurasia. In so doing, they linked up all the peripheral civilizations of Eurasia via
its urbanized core, Central Asia, which quickly became the commercial-cultural
heart of not only Central Asia, but of the Eurasian world as a whole. (p. 112)
Beckwith here makes note of the detailed attention paid to Central Asia in historical
sources on the Early Middle Ages — particularly Chinese, Tibetan, Arab sources —
and to a lesser extent, as provided in Greek and Latin sources — demonstrating the
importance of this central region to all the realms on its periphery.
Beckwith states:
The reason for all this attention is clearly not modern historians’ imaginary
threat of a nomad warrior invasion, which is virtually unmentioned in the
sources. The reason for the attention seems rather to be the prosperous Silk
Road economy and the existence of a shared political ideology across
Eurasia that ensured nearly constant warfare. . . [as] each nation believed its
own emperor to be the sole rightful ruler of "all under Heaven," and
everyone else should be his subjects. 3(p. 137)
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But of course! How could it be otherwise?
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Interestingly, though the region experienced almost constant warfare during this period,
trade on the Silk Road "flourished as never before," (p. 112) at least until a ChineseArab alliance was victorious over the Central Asians (p. 113) in the mid-eighth century.
Chapter 6, “The Silk Road, Revolution, and Collapse,” details what the title states, a
time when, within a period of 13 years every empire in Eurasia suffered a major
rebellion, revolution, or dynastic change (p. 140). Chapter 7, “The Vikings and Cathay”
discusses an era of smaller hegemonies, the Khazars, Karakhanids, Ghaznavids,
Seljuks, western Hsia, Tanguts, Khitan, Jurchen, among others, as well as advances in
education and culture that occurred during this time. Chapter 8 concerns “Chinggis
Khan and the Mongol Conquests,” as expansive-world- civilization-enthusiast Chinggis
Khan and his uber-Central Eurasian Culture Complex comitatus retinue create the first
truly global civilization and, as a side effect, birth the Pax Mongolica.
Subsequent chapters track even more traces of the Central Eurasian Culture Complex
over time, up to the present day, its adherents romp westward, ever-westward, doing so
in times of economic successes and failures, social and political upheavals, all the way
up to the bleak final shut-down of the Silk Road in its entirety, as Central Eurasia loses
all autonomy, is divvied up between Imperial Russia and Imperial China to be
voraciously devoured. In the end, the energy of the region is annihilated — like the
once-vibrant and powerful Uighur Empire, the Tibetan Empire, the Sogdians, et al., et
al., et al. Like all phenomena, the civilizations of Central Asia are seen to be
impermanent, and indeed, are.
I found this book to be a lasting delight. It is lavishly bejeweled with footnotes and
endnotes, some so seductive as to make it hard to proceed forward through the main
text because its tangents are so alluring. It made me want to know more and more about
Central Eurasia in even more detail. It made me want to learn Proto-Indo-European.
No, really, it did.
Perhaps my favorite section was an Epilogue, entitled “THE BARBARIANS,” in which
Beckwith corrects a record that surely merits correction, in which the warriors of
Central Eurasia were barbarians. Greedy, poor, backward, uncivilized barbarians
picking on the jolly friendly sedentary citizens by engaging in indiscriminate slaughter.
Beckwith suggests that Central Eurasians were not poor compared to the nations on
their periphery but were wealthier and more liberal and more cosmopolitan and more
tolerant of a variety of cultures and more appreciative of invention, intellect, artistry,
and spirituality. They were interested in wealth gained through trade. They engaged
in warfare with others when access to trade was denied them.
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In war, they were not barbarians — or to the extent that they were barbaric, were no
more barbaric than anyone else. In fact, Beckwith makes the case that they were
arguably less barbaric, pointing out that:
while the bloody victories of Attila, Chinggis or Tamerlane are still deplored, the
equally bloody victories of the Graeco-Roman, Persian, and Chinese emperors are
related with enthusiasm by historians past and present. Non-Central Eurasian
historians from Antiquity to the present have been blind to the savagery and
unrelenting aggression of their own ancestors . . . [Central Eurasians] cannot begin
to be compared, for sheer cruelty and relentless aggression, to the Romans, the
Persians, the Chinese, and their successors, right down to modern times (p. 323).
[Emphasis mine.]
Modern historians continue to operate under an aspersive spell cast by some historian
propagandists from peripheral nations who find the traumatic memory of having been
vanquished time and again by un-civilized, un-sedentary, ruthless, couth-less, dirty,
smelly victorious Others too painful to acknowledge.
Thus, the victorious Others are to be dismissed, disparaged, their actual glory deleted
from official texts and erased from social consciousness. Alternatively, a culture might
choose to demonize the victorious Other and thus create a useful larger than life enemy
upon which to focus national hatred; one must learn to “Never Forget National
Humiliation”4 in patriotic perpetuity. So it goes, throughout history, as to all the bad
barbarians: the Hsiung-nu hordes, the Scythian hordes, the Tibetan hordes, the Parthian
hordes, the Turk hordes, the Mongol hordes, et alia.
We are scions of “barbarians.” As Beckwith states: “Central Asians — not the
Egyptians, the Sumerians, and so on — are our ancestors. Central Eurasia is our
homeland, the place where our civilization started.” (p. 319)
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